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IN THE SUPREME, COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDITH RAGGENBUCK, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
EMIL SUHRMANN, djbja SUHR-
MANN'S SOUTH TEMPLE MEAT 
COMPANY, and ALBERT NOORDA 
and SAM L. GUSS, djbja JORDAN 
MEAT & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
and VALLEY SAUSAGE COM-
pANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 8753 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
(Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the 
record. The parties will be referred to here as they ap-
peared in the trial court.) 
STATEMEN'l, OF CASE 
In the Pre-trial Order the trial court, among other 
things, made the fol1owing order: 
"It is hereby ordered that all cases filed 
against these defendants and each of them per-
taining to damages for trichinosis claimed to be 
contracted from eating mettwurst will be con-
solidated for trial as to liability, and those not 
so consolidated will be dismissed." 
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The defendants in the eleven cases here involved 
petitioned this Court for an urder permitting an Inter-
mediate Appeal from the above quoted order The peti-
tion was granted and we are now in the Supreme Court 
on the question of whether the trial court had authority 
to make this order and whether it abused its discretion. 
While it should be of no importance, the defendants 
have given a biased picture of the case. From the testi-
mony it will .appear that the Valley Sausage Company 
and the Jordan Meat & Livestock Company are uperated 
by the same individuals. The Jordan ~I eat & Livestock 
Company purchases all meats used in the joint operation 
and "sells" to Valley Sausage Comp.any the meat prod-
ucts necessary to make sausage. The Valley Sausage 
Company then "sells" the sausage to Jordan Meat & 
Livestock Company, which company then distributes to 
the retail customers. It is the contention of pl.aintiffs that 
the smoking of the mettwurst in the Suhrmann oven was 
part and parcel of the business being conducted by the 
Valley Sausage and Jurdan 1\Ieat & Livestock Company. 
As a matter of fact, the testimony will disclose that a 
considerable .amount of this mettwurst was returned by 
Suhrmann to Jordan Meat & Livestock Company which 
in turn sold this mettwurst to retail outlets. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES FOR TRIAL ON THE QUES-
TION OF LIABILITY ONLY IS NOT ERRONEOUS, IS NOT 
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CONTRAEY TO LAW, AND IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE 
·CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
POINT II. 
THE I--RE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES AS TO LIABILITY ONLY 
IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO 'THE DEFENDANTS, AND 
WOULD NOT RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO THE 
DEFENDANTS AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING SAID ORDER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES FOR TRIAL ON THE QUES-
TION OF LIABILITY ONLY IS NOT ERRONEOUS, IS NOT 
CONTRARY TO LAW, AND IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE 
·CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The defendants contend they have been deprived of 
a jury trial ~y this urder. The order merely consolidated 
the cases for trial on the question of liability. After the 
liability of the defendants has been established by a jury 
then there will be a trial of the damage issues before 
other juries. When the damage portion of the cases are 
tried the cases will be grouped so there will be a number 
of plaintiffs in each trial. The order does not detail how 
this shall be accomplished, but it undoubtedly will be in 
keeping with the practice of the District Court. 
Rule 42, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as 
follows: 
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a 
common question of law or fact are pending 
before the court, it may order a joint hearing 
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or trial 'Of any or all the matters in issue in 
the actions; it may order all the actions con-
solidated; and it may make such orders con-
cerning proceedings therein as may tend to 
avoid unnecessary costs or delay. 
(b) Separate Trials. The court in furtherance of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order 
a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, 
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any 
separate issue or of any number of claims, 
cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party 
claims, or issues." 
Under subdivision (a) the court may order a joint 
hearing or trial of any issue. -c nder Subdivision (b) the 
court may order a separate trial of .any separate issue. 
The order as made by the trial court comes within the 
provisions of this rule. In order to prevail upon their 
contenti'On that the order made is unconstitutional, de-
fendants must establish that this Court promulgated an 
unconstitutional rule. 
Smith v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., ~03 X.Y. 499, 96 
N.E. 1106, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 137, Ann. Cas. 1913 B ~Gi, 
supports the proposition that the rule and order are not 
unconstitutional. Defendant there had raised the defense 
of the statute of limitations. The trial court ordered that 
the issue on the statute of limitations should be first tried 
and the balance of the issues should thereafter be tried. 
This order of the trial court was upheld on appeal. The 
statute under which the order was 1nade provided: 
"The court in its discretion 1nay 'Order one 
or 1nore issues to be separately tried ·prior to anY 
trial of the other issues in the case." · 
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The constitutional provision which defendant claimed 
was violated provided as follows: 
"The trial by jury in all cases in which it has 
been heretofore used shall remain inviolate for-
ever." 
In holding that this rule was not in violation of the 
constitution the court stated: 
"It is well settled that the object of such a 
provision is to preserve the substance of the right 
of trial by jury, rather than to prescribe the de-
tails of the methods by which it shall be exercised 
and enjoyed ***. 
"Even if we assume .as I think we should, 
that this section of the Code permits separate 
trials of separate issues at different times, before 
different juries, it seems very clear that it does 
not destroy or impair the substantial right of a 
litigant to have his case tried before a proper jury, 
but only prescribes the method in which this may 
be done. Every issue is submitted to the verdict 
of a jury. This is the substance of the right. As a 
matter of convenience, the court may order some 
issues to be tried before others are taken up. This, 
is a matter of procedure and detail. The consti-
tution does not provide and there should not be 
interpolated into it a provision, that all of the 
issues, even though completely separate and dis-
tinct, must be tried at one and the same time. No 
amount of analysis will disclose any such protec-
tion or benefit to a litigant in having all of the 
issues submitted to a single jury as will render 
such a right one of the essential one.s secured by 
the constitution. On the contrary, it is at once 
apparent that the convenience of litigants may be 
much promoted by a prior trial of v.arious juris-
dictional and preliminary issues, and it is to be 
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presumed that courts will so administer the pro-
vision in question as to make it remedial and bene-
ficial rather than burdensome. 
"There are many decisions which, in my opin-
ion, sustain the view that the legislature had 
power to enact the section as a regulation of mere 
procedure, and without impairing any constitu-
tional rights, and reference will be made to some 
of them." 
In Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P. 2d 589, a some-
what similar situation was presented. The case involved 
an action to establish the amount due on a note and to 
have it declared a lien and the lien foreclosed. On a pre-
vious appeal the Supreme Court had held the basis of 
the action was to detennine the amount due on the obliga-
tion and was hence an action at law .and a jury finding 
was binding upon the court. Before the case was tried 
a second time the legislature amended the statutes by 
providing that suits to foreclose mortgages and other 
liens were equitable and the verdict of .a jury advisory. 
Contention was made that the amendment was unconsti-
tutional because it interfered with a right of trial by jury. 
In overruling this contention the court stated: 
''The 1945 amend1nent does not deal with the 
substantive right of the parties on which they re-
lied in their dealings with one .another out of 
which this action arose, but only deals with the 
method, or machinery of determining what the 
facts are. It provides that in cases of this kind the 
jury's decision is only advisory to the trial court 
and such cases are cases in equity and therefore 
under the Constitution the facts n1ust be reviewed 
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by this court on appeal. That is by nature a pro-
cedural rather than a substantive right." 
* * * 
"Substantive law is defined as the positive 
law which creates, defines and regulates the rights 
and duties of the parties and which may give rise 
to a cause for action, as distinguished from adjec-
tive law which pertains to and prescribes the prac-
tice and procedure or the legal machinery by which 
the substantive law is determined or made effec-
tive." 
* * * 
"This statute does not contravene any con-
stitutional provision and it certainly does not de-
prive any one of due process of law." 
In Walker v. N e~c Mexico & S. P. R. Co., 165 U.S. 
593, 17 Sup. Ct. 421, 41 L. Ed. 831, a New Mexico terri-
torial statute provided for special findings of fact and 
authorized the trial court to submit a case to the jury 
on special findings and a general verdict. The statute 
further provided that in the event there was a conflict 
between the two, the special findings should prevail over 
the general verdict. A judgment was entered on the spe-
cial findings contrary to the general verdict. The court 
held this statute did not impair the right of trial by jury 
and the court stated : 
"The question is whether this act of the terri-
torial legislature in substance impairs the right of 
trial by jury. The seventh amendment, indeed, 
does not attempt to regulate matters of ple.ading 
or practice, or to determine in what way issues 
shall be framed by which questions of fact are to 
be submitted to a jury. Its aim is not to preserve 
mere matters of form and procedure, but sub-
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stance of right. This requires that que;;tions of 
faet in common-law actions shall be settled by a 
jury, and that the court shall not assume, di~ectly 
or indirectly, to take from the jury or to Itself 
such prerogative. So long as this substance of 
right is preserved, the procedure by which this 
result shall be reached is wholly within the discre-
tion of the legislature, and the courts may not 
set aside any legislative provision in this respect 
because the form of action-the mere manner in 
which questions are submitted-is different from 
that which obtained at the common law." 
See also Gasoline Products Co. t·. Chamberlain Rfg. 
Co., 283 U.S. 494, 51 S. Ct. 513, 75 L. Ed. 1188; JJ ay De-
partment Stores Co., v. Bell, 61 F. 2d 830. 
There is nothing in either sections 7 or 10 of Article 
1 of the Utah Constitution which in any way prohibits the 
type of order made in this case or the promulgation of 
such a rule as Rule -±:2, r tah Rules of CiYil Procedure. 
Section 7 is merely the general provision prohibiting 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law. Section 10, so far as civil rases are con-
cerned, sets forth the number of jurors which shall make 
up the jury and the number of jurors necessary to return 
a verdict. The order and rule in the rase at bar n1erely 
establishes a method of detennining facts by a jury or 
juries. They do not affect the snbstantiYe right of trial 
by jury which is .all the constitution protects. 
We submit that there is nothing here which would in 
any way give any credence or 1nerit to defendants' con-
tentions. 
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The authorities all uphold the exercise by the trial 
court of its discretion in ordering a trial of liability 
separate and apart from that of damages. 
In 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure, Page 657, Section 941, states as follows: 
"Where several actions are ordered to be 
tried together but each retains its separate char-
acter and requires the entry of a separate judg-
ment. This type of consolidation does not merge 
the suits into a single action, or cause the parties 
to one action to be parties to another. In this type 
of situation the court may not only order that all 
.actions be tried together but may also order that 
any issue common to them be so tried. Rule 42 (a) 
expressly provides that the court may order a 
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in 
issue in the actions. For example if several per-
sons are suing the same defendant for injuries 
sustained in the same accident, the court may 
order a joint trial of the issue of defendant's lia-
bility, leaving the issue of damages to be deter-
mined in each case if the issue of liability is de-
termined against the defendant. It is interesting 
to note that much the same procedure would have 
resulted under Rule 42 (b) in a case in which all 
the plaintiffs had joined in the same action and 
the court ordered a separate trial of the issue of 
liability." 
And again .at Page 663, Section 942, it is stated: 
"As pointed out in Section 941, a number of 
actions in tort arising out of the same occurrence 
may be consolidated for the trial of the issue of 
negligence. If the plaintiffs prevail on this issue, 
separate trials may be subsequently had in each 
case as to the remaining issues." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
5 Moore's Federal Practice 1217, Section 42.03, .states 
the rule as follows : 
"Separate trial may properly be ordered on 
the issue of the defendant's lia;bility to respond in 
damages, particularly where plaintiff's proof of 
damages would involve the testimony of a large 
number of person.s. This procedure has been 
privately recommended by a number of members 
of the judiciary as a means of expediting trials 
and of saving time and expense. We have found 
no reason why this procedure, which is authorized 
by Rule 42 (b) should not be more extensively 
employed. A separate trial may be granted on a 
particular issue after appeal and remand for fur-
ther proceedings.'' 
InN ettles v. General Accident Fire and Life Assur-
ance Corp., 234 F. 2d 243, the court ordered three actions 
arising out of the same automobile collision to be con-
solidated for trial on the question of liability only. This 
ruling was upheld by the circuit court and it was stated 
in the opinion : 
"Appellants' objection to the trial court's 
having consolidated the three civil actions with the 
interpleader action is also without merit. Con-
solidation of the several cases involving common 
questions of law .and fact for trial under Rule -!:2, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was in all re-
spects proper." 
In /(lager v. Inland Power & Lipllf Company, 1 
F.R.D. 114 and Rickenbacker Transportation, Inc. r. 
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 3 F.R.D. 202, the question of lia-
bility in tort actions was ordered to be tried separately 
from the question of damages. 
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It has been held proper for the trial court to order 
a separate trial of the issue as to the validity of a release 
relied upon by defendant in a personal injury case. Bowie 
v. Sorrell, 209 F. 2d 49; Kilospki v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
103 F. Supp. 390; Larson v. Powell, 16 F.R.D. 322. 
In Carr v. Beverly Hills Corporation, 237 F. 2d 323, 
the trial court tried a jurisdictional issue separately. 
In approving, the court stated: 
"By another rule, the court is empowered to 
isolate and try any issue in the case. Rule 42 (b) 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. 
Since jurisdiction depends upon the facts and not, 
in the final analysis, upon the pleading, we hold 
it was proper for the court to try the facts at the 
basis of this question before going further. This 
is e_specially to be commended because, as noted 
above, the question must be tried, is decisive and 
cannot be waived. There is nothing inconsistent 
in this determination with the cases tried or dis-
posed of before the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were adopted. All these are to be distin-
guished." 
Defendants quote Sections 78-21-1 and 2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, and as.sert that because the definite 
article "the" is used before the word jury it means that 
all issues of fact in a given case must be submitted to one 
jury. The legislature did not in any way seek to reach 
this subject. It merely affirmed the right of a person to a 
jury trial. An examination of said Section 1 disclose.s that 
"in actions for the recovery *** for injuries, an issue of 
fact may be tried by a jury ***." This would indicate a 
specific issue of fact may be tried by a jury and then upon 
determination of that issue another issue of fact may be 
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tried by another jury. In any event, Rule 42 authorizes 
the procedure which was ordered in the case at bar. The 
statutes relate to the substantive right of jury trial and 
the rule relates to a procedural matter defining the 
methods by which facts may be determined by a jury. 
Defendants are not deprived of a jury trial. All of the 
issues in this case will eventually be submitted to a jury. 
Defendants have cited .a number of authorities in 
their brief, but we submit they are not in point here and 
have the further disability that they are of ancient vin-
tage. We are concerned here with a rule which became 
effective in 1950. This rule in turn was patterned after 
the ]"~ederal rule on the same subject and those rules 
were promulgated in 1937 and amended in 1946. The 
cases cited range from 1869 to 1918. 
In Donnatin v. [~nion Hardware & JI etal Co., 38 Cal. 
App. 8, 175 P. 26, 177 P. 8-±5 (1918), plaintiff sought to 
recover for personal injuries. The jury returned a ver-
dict in his favor of $1.00. He 1noved for a new trial on the 
question of damages only. The court's denial of this mo-
tion was .affirmed. The court rightly ruled that this was 
obviously a compromise verdict and that the mnount was 
so grossly absurb that it furnished convincing proof that 
in order to reach an agreen1ent the verdict was the re-
sult of unwarranted concessions of convictions made 
by each of two opposing factions of the jury. Here there 
had been no proper detern1ination of the issue of liability 
and the trial court's order was affinned. The order "~as 
within the discretion of the trial court. 
:Motion was Inade to permit a transfer of the ease 
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13 
to the Supreme Court of California and in 177 P. 845, the 
Supreme Court recognized the right of a court to order 
a new trial on limited issues and the court stated: 
"The power of the court to order a new trial 
on limited issues is well settled. It has discretion 
to order a new trial generally or only in part. Its 
discretion is this regard is properly invoked by a 
motion for a new trial of the entire case, and it 
may well be doubted whether this discretion can 
be circumscribed by me.ans of a motion for a new 
trial of one issue alone. A determination of this 
question is, however, not essential to the decision 
of the present case, and we do not here determine 
it. In any view, the trial court may properly deny 
a limited new trial where it is of opinion, on the 
whole record before it, that substantial justice re-
quires that a new trial, if granted .at all, should 
cover all the issues." 
A~ a matter of fact separate trials of the issue of 
liability and of the issue of damages are not new in cases 
where new trials have been ordered. 39 Am. Jur. 44, New 
Trial, section 21; Annotations at 98 A.L.R. 941, 29 A.L.R. 
2d 1199. In this latter annotation the rule is stated as 
follows (1203): 
"With the few exceptions noted under the 
heading 'Contrary view,' infra, it is universally 
recognized and held either with or without a per-
tinent statute or rule of court, that a new trial 
gr.anted on the ground of the inadequacy of the 
damages awarded may in a proper case be limited 
to the issue of damages only." 
Where code provisions or rules are applicable, the 
rule is stated as follows (1205): 
"In many jurisdictions code provision or rules 
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14 
of court providing for the granting of a new trial 
to all or .any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues have been construed or recognized as au-
thorizing the granting of a new trial on the issue 
of damages alone in a proper case where the ver-
dict originally rendered is found to be inade-
quate.'' 
In Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Company, 
228 U.S. 364, 33 Sup. Ct. 523, 57 L. Ed. 879 (1912), a 
general verdict for plaintiff was rendered by the jury. 
Defendant moved for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and this latter motion was denied. The Circuit 
court reversed and ordered that judgment be entered for 
defendant. The Supreme Court held the authority of a 
Federal appellate court was limited to ordering a new 
trial and that such court had no power to direct the 
entry of judgment. 
The other authorities cited under this point of de-
fendants' brief are ones which were cited and quoted 
in the Slocum case. They are even less in point than the 
Slocum case. In Petty v. Schmeider, 9 ""Tall. 2-!S, 19 L. 
Ed. 648 ( 1869), testimony taken in another case was in-
troduced in evidence but not read to the jury. The trial 
court told the jury in his instruction what this evidence 
established. In such a case the cmnplaining party against 
whom the evidence was introduced was deprived of a 
jury trial because the evidence was not even sub1nitted 
to the jury. In Hodges v. Easton~ 106lT.S. -!OS, 1 Sup. Ct. 
307, 27 L. Ed. 169 (1882). the plaintiff urged that the 
court in its order of reversal direct the trial court to re-
strict the next trial to such issues as were not subn1itted 
to the jury. The court express}~~ refused to 1nake a deter-
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mination of its power to make such an order inasmuch 
as the issues decided by the jury were not submitted to 
it in the method required by law. The court reversed 
and ordered a whole new trial. Neither of these cases has 
anything to do with the problem before the court in the 
case at bar. 
Defendants, throughout the first point, make general 
allegations that the trial of liability only and damages 
later would result in great inconvenience to all concerned 
and that such order and trial would greatly prejudice the 
parties. The defendants do not state specifically of what 
this prejudice or inconvenience consists. Implicit, how-
ever, in their .argument is the contention that a jury 
considering both questions of liability and damage may 
compromise or cut down damages because it might think 
the proof of liability to be weak. A jury could not prop-
erly arrive at a verdict in this manner. The proper pro-
cedure would be for the jury to first make a determina-
tion of the question of liability and if it determined there 
w.as no liability that would end the case. If it found that 
there was liability then the next consideration should be 
that of damage. We do not believe that any defendants 
have a right to a compromise verdict and such verdict 
is not part and parcel of the right of trial by jury. 
The trial court believed that it would be in further-
ance of convenience and in avoidance of prejudice to 
order a separate trial on the question of liability. It 
would bring about a determination of one phase of the 
case and if favorable to defendants it would end the mat-
ter. If favorable to plaintiffs then the only proof in the 
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next group of cases would relate to damages. In the 
interests of time, economy, and the fair and just dis-
position of the litigation, the court properly ordered a 
separation of trials. This will not multiply the number 
of trials but will cut them down considerably and elimi-
nate the need for the continual presentation in each case 
of evidence on the question of liability. It would be a 
physical and mental impossibility for one jury to retain 
in mind the names and damages of each of 19 plaintiffs 
who are involved in the 11 cases now before the court. 
One of the questions on the issue of liability is 
whether or not Suhrmann was acting as agent for Valley 
Sausage or Jordan Meat in smoking the mettwurst. Un-
der the trial court's order this will only have to be tried 
once. Would it not be in the interest of time and economy 
not to have Mr. Suhrmann, ~Irs. Suhrmann, :\Irs. Young, 
Alfred Hoffman, Albert N oorda, Karl Klindt and :\Ir. 
Goeller testify concerning this issue eleven different 
times~ This alone justifies the order. There are other 
factual matters which go to the issue of liability only and 
one trial likewise will cause a saYing in tilne and expense 
in these matters. 
These are the considerations which ilnpelled the trial 
court to enter the order fr01n which appeal is here taken. 
We submit that the order was neither in violation of 
the constitution, contrary to law. or erroneous. 
POINT II. 
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES AS TO LIABILITY ONLY 
IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANTS, AND 
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WOULD NOT RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO THE 
DEFENDANTS AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING SAID ORDER. 
Under this point in their brief defendants contend 
that the order is prejudicial to them and would result in 
manifest injustice to them. 
The courts uniformly hold under Rule 42 the con-
solidation of cases, or the separation of the trial of issues, 
is a matter which lies within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and its order with respect thereto will not be 
reversed unless the appellate court finds there has been 
an abuse of discretion. Chicago R. I. & P .R. Co. 
v. Williams, 245 F. 2d 397; Davis v. Yellow Cab Company, 
220 F. 2d 790; 5 Moore's Federal Practice (2nd Ed.) 1204, 
section 42.02. 
Under the authorities heretofore cited and the argu-
ment heretofore made, the making of this order was not 
an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and 
hence the order should be affirmed. Two cases are cited 
under Point II of the Brief of Appellants. It should be 
observed that both of these cases are from federal dis-
trict courts and do not involve an appellate review of an 
order made under Rule 42. It may well be that under 
either of these cases the trial court could have either 
granted or denied the motion and the ruling would not 
have been an abuse of discretion. The.se cases are only 
helpful in disclosing the manner in which the trial courts 
exercised their discretion. 
In United States v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 9 
F.R.D. 179, the action sounded in fraud, which has 
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nothing to do with the situation presented in the case at 
bar. 
In Eichinger v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 20 
F.R.D. 204, the plaintiff brought action to recover dam-
ages resulting from an explosion in his grain elevator. 
The action was brought against insurance companies and 
against the contractor who had constructed the elevator. 
Another party intervened who apparently claimed to 
own some of the property destroyed in the elevator. The 
insurance companies sought a separate trial on the issues 
between plaintiff and the insurance companies. This was 
denied and the court concluded that one trial would be 
adequate, more economical and would bring about a just 
determination of the litigation. There onl:~ one suit was 
involved and the defendant insurance companies were 
seeking to make out of it more than one trial. 
In the cases at bar there are 11 separate suits involv-
ing 19 plaintiffs. The order cutting down the trial of 
liability to one case and then a determination of damages 
will eliminate the necessity for a trial of liability in 11 
distinct cases and will eliminate calling witnesses on lia-
bility time and time again. \Vith the question of liability 
determined, the courts and juries may then make a deter-
mination of damage if the liability problem has been de-
termined in the favor of the various plaintiffs. \V e sub-
mit there was no prejudice to defendants and no mani-
fest injustice to them. 
CO~CLlTSION 
We submit that under the situation existing in the 
cases at bar the trial court was well advised to attempt 
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to cut down the numbe,r of trials and the necessity of 
continually recalling witnesses on liability. The trial of 
the question of liability will eliminate once and for all 
that problem. It may end the case at that point. If it 
does not, then the trial of damages may be held in the 
future in various groups of these cases .and plaintiffs. 
The order does not eliminate the right of defendants 
to have each and every issue tried by a jury of their peers. 
It may be that more than one jury will decide the issues, 
but there is nothing in the constitution, statutes, or au-
thorities which would militate again.st the authority of 
the court to order separate trials before separate juries. 
Under Rule 42 that procedure is contemplated. To hold 
otherwise would eliminate Rule -12 and hold that it meant 
nothing insofar as it authorized consolidation of issues 
or separation of issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGs, WALLACE, RoBERTS & BLACK 
CANNON & DuFFIN 
Counsel for Respondents 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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